The technological mediation approach aspires to complement current Technology Assessment (TA) practices. It aims to do so by addressing ethical concerns from 'within' human-technology relations leading to ethical Constructive Technology Assessment (eCTA), as articulated by Kiran, Asle H., Nelly Oudshoorn, and Peter-Paul Verbeek in their 2015 article. In this paper, we problematize this ambition. Firstly, we situate the technological mediation approach in the history of TA. Secondly, as a study into the normativity from 'within' humantechnology relations, we reveal the phenomenological and existential origins of Verbeek's technological mediation approach. Thirdly, we show that there are two possible readings of this approach: a strong and a weak one. The weak reading can augment current TA practices but is eventually uncommitted to the idea of technological mediation. The strong reading defines a wholly new scope for our engagement with (emerging) technologies but is incompatible with existing TA approaches.
Introduction
There has been an increasing amount of literature proposing how ethical and normative considerations should be explicitly integrated into practices of responsible research and innovation (e.g. Brey 2016; Grunwald 2011; Swierstra 2015; Taebi et al. 2014 ; Van der Poel 2016) . Peter-Paul Verbeek has recently made a critical, though appreciative move towards this field by proposing to augment existing practices of ethical and Constructive Technology Assessment (CTA) with the 'technological mediation approach' (Verbeek 2011) . Contrary to the external criteria of assessment used within the field of TA, Verbeek calls attention to the morality of artifacts, arising within relations between humans and technologies. Highlighting this morality 'from within' ought to inspire an ethics of technological accompaniment, complementing (or even replacing) current assessment procedures. In this paper, we will question whether the technological mediation approach can indeed function as complement, or is rather a replacement of existing practices of ethical TA.
TA, broadly defined, is concerned with the prediction, anticipation, explication and avoidance of possibly harmful impacts of new and emerging technologies. Originally, TA relied on 'hard', quantitative data, such as risk calculations, to help governmental decision-making. Lately, the scope of TA broadened to include ethical considerations concerning the quality of human-technology interaction. This invited philosophers of technology, among them postphenomenologists, to critically engage with this field.
According to postphenomenologists, people perceive and interact with the world through technologies (cf. Ihde 1990; Verbeek 2005) . Technologies actively mediate how people relate to the world, with the notion 'technological mediation' describing this position. Emphasizing the primacy of the relatedness between people, technologies and the world, postphenomenologists endorse the 'co-constitution' of people and their material environment. 'Co-constitution' means that, rather than existing independently, the relevant features of a person, a technological medium and the world appear as a result of their mutual relatedness. A technological mediation approach thereby challenges the 'externalist' or 'liberalist' position that aims to study technologies from an independent and neutral perspective.
Postphenomenological analyses are predominantly descriptive, triggering theoretical reflections regarding the role of technology in scientific and everyday practices (Ihde 2009 ). Such considerations provide no clear normative assessment of emerging technologies, which some present as a criticism against postphenomenology's practical usefulness (e.g. Feenberg 2015; Romele 2017) . Peter-Paul Verbeek, in his 2011 book Moralizing Technology, tried to move beyond the descriptive analyses of postphenomenology by uncovering the morality of artifacts and suggested augmenting CTA with such normative considerations (Verbeek 2011) . More recently, it was argued that the technological mediation approach should influence the moral design and assessment of technologies (Kiran, Oudshoorn, and Verbeek 2015) . The ambition of the technological mediation approach to contribute to the TA field is thus very explicit.
In this paper, we critically review this ambition of the technological mediation approach. Firstly, we briefly survey the historical development of TA, identifying the 'external yardstick procedure' in TA that the technological mediation approach challenges ( §2.1). We then highlight several ways in which the mediation approach takes a normative stance by calling attention to values constituted 'within' the human-technology relations ( §2.2). Secondly, we identify the normativity 'from within' as consisting of a phenomenological ( §3.1) and an existential ( §3.2) component. Though different, so we argue, both can hardly be separated ( §3.3). Thirdly, we determine whether this normativity from within can function as an addition or valuable alternative to existing TA approaches. We discern between a weak ( §4.1) and a strong ( §4.2) reading of the technological mediation approach. Only the weak reading, we argue, can augment existing TA practices; the strong reading conflicts with it ( §4.3).
On assessment, accompaniment, and normativity
Ethics of technology primarily concerns normative assessment. The technological mediation approach, taken at face value, does not provide such an assessment. However, Kiran, Oudshoorn, and Verbeek (2015) suggested to augment current TA practices with the mediation approach. In this section, we scrutinize this ambition by positioning the technological mediation approach within the canvas of TA practice.
Technology assessment over time
TA presents a practical way of 'doing ethics' by evaluating how new and emerging technologies influence our lives. To understand the goal and scope of TA, we will trace its evolution over time. TA was first institutionalized in the USA in 1972 with the opening of the Office of Technology Assessment in the US Congress. The Office aimed to help guide technological developments so that their impact produces no harm and contributes to a desirable development of society. TA was to achieve that by anticipating and evaluating (un)intended consequences, and internal benefits and negative externalities of technologies ( US Congress 1972) . Van Est and Brom classify this as classical Parliamentary TA, 'a form of expert-based policy analysis to identify and evaluate in an early stage the potential secondary consequences of technology ' (2012, 6) . The Office thus served as an early warning system that would provide Congress with expert reports, forming the basis of regulatory decisions. Health TA also springs as a classical TA paradigm in this period, concerned with issues of efficiency and safety. Under the influence of rising healthcare costs, a 'cost-benefit analysis [became] a widely used management tool to support decision-making by physicians and policy makers on the use of new medical technologies ' (ibid., 8) .
The focus of TA on harm avoidance led to a reliance on quantification in decisionmaking regarding new technologies also beyond Health TA. Numerical appraisal of health, safety, security and other values provided a constructive way to determine the extent of harm and to measure the possibility of danger (Swierstra and te Molder 2012) . According to Swierstra (2015) , several methods originated within TA 'to quantify both the chance that a hazard would occur and the undesirable outcome itself to transform fuzzy, unmanageable 'hazards' into specific 'risks' that could serve as the basis for policy decisions' (6). The resulting calculation of risks versus benefits of a new technology were guided by the 'no harm' principle and allowed stakeholders to assess the future of a given technology. 1 European TA institutions emerged in the 1980s-1990s, inspired by the US experience. Contrary to it, the approach to TA in Europe was participatory, aimed at broadening public and political discussion on social implications of technologies. Participatory TA aimed to overcome the top-down expert-based model of classical TA and focused on expanding the group of stakeholders to achieve societal debate and consensus on controversial issues related to new technologies (Van Est and Brom 2012) .
Building on the deliberative democratic model of participatory TA, CTA emerged in the 1990s in the Netherlands. Science and Technology Studies inspired CTA in emphasizing the co-shaping of technology and society. This deepened public debate on matters of science and technology, and opened the design process to similar deliberations (Rip, Misa, and Schot 1995; Schot and Rip 1997) . CTA became a more forward-looking way of TA as compared to classical TA: while classical TA aspired to articulate concerns when technologies already entered society, CTA problematized technology development at an early stage in order to feed societal concerns back into the development process, while technologies are still emerging (Schot and Rip 1997) .
The moral, qualitative implications of technologies are harder to trace, predict and account for than quantifiable concerns such as risks (Swierstra, Stemerding, and Boenink 2009) . Despite its emphasis on socio-technical entanglement, the assessment framework of (C)TA did not explicitly consider the qualitative moral dimensions of such an interrelation. Palm and Hansson intended to fill this gap by developing an ethical Technology Assessment (eTA) 'as a tool for identifying adverse effects of new technologies at an early stage ' (2006, 543) . The authors offered a checklist approach, consisting of nine 'crucial ethical aspects of technology', that aspired to fill the ethics gap in existing TA approaches. Kiran, Oudshoorn, and Verbeek (2015) also expressed an ambition to integrate qualitative ethical concerns into TA. They identified several major problems in eTA. Firstly, eTA focuses on undesirable moral outcomes of innovation and on inhibiting existing moral routines. This prevents eTA from being open to the positive moral developments related to new technologies. Secondly, eTA mainly follows a checklist approach, and hence considers only limited pre-defined ethical issues, evaluated according to fixed ethical principles. Lastly, user experiences and particular technological practices remain external to eTA. As such, the results of eTA may neglect ethical issues emerging in particular socio-material contexts. In sum, Kiran, Oudshoorn, and Verbeek (2015) argued that these challenges prevent eTA from adequately accounting for the qualitative ethical dimension of technologies in TA.
It is precisely this 'normative deficit' (Grunwald 1999) in TA that Kiran, Oudshoorn, and Verbeek (2015) want to overcome under the header of ethical Constructive Technology Assessment (eCTA). To achieve this, they suggest to complement CTA with the technological mediation approach. Notable contemporary examples addressing normative deficit in TA are the interventionist participatory approaches of midstream modulation (Fisher, Mahajan, and Mitcham 2006) and hermeneutic TA (Grin and Grunwald 2000; Grunwald 2016 ). Midstream modulation aims to enhance the 'responsive capacity' 'midstream' in the technological development process by asking interdisciplinary stakeholders to reflect on the social and ethical aspects of technological development (Fisher, Mahajan, and Mitcham 2006) . Hermeneutic TA highlights the importance of techno-visionary futures in shaping the debates about the technology and argues that such visions need to be carefully assessed to conduct TA in a responsible way (Grin and Grunwald 2000) . In contrast with these approaches, eCTA aims to overcome the normative deficit by focusing on the normativities provided by concrete technologies themselves.
Compensating for the 'normative deficit' in TA with ethical Constructive Technology Assessment
The technological mediation approach originated in the field of postphenomenology as a way to analyze human-technology relations (Ihde 1990; Verbeek 2005) . It endorses the coconstituted nature of people and technologies, traces the mediating effects of such assemblages and analyzes resulting mediations. The mediating effects, or mediations under study, are the ways in which technologies co-shape, enable, challenge or change the engagement of people with the world. The technological mediation approach thus aims to analyze the quality, structure and role of human engagement with the world in relation with technologies (Verbeek 2011, 15-16) . However, such an analysis does not necessarily include normative evaluation.
While TA approaches acknowledge the connection between people and technology, they fail to adequately account for the qualitative ethical implications of such an entanglement. More precisely, they fail to acknowledge that human values and norms are not static but too are established in relation with technologies: technologies co-shape values and standards behind evaluative frameworks (Verbeek 2011) . In other words, technologies mediate the normative frameworks by means of which we assess these same technologies. Consequently, technologies co-shape the ethical debate around them. This prompts Verbeek (2011) to ask how to both acknowledge the mediated frameworks of evaluation and to still provide a coherent evaluation for an informed decision concerning the use and development of technologies. According to Verbeek (2011) and Kiran, Oudshoorn, and Verbeek (2015) , the technological mediation approach can do just that by augmenting TA practice with eCTA.
It is precisely at this point that the mediation approach manifests its normative nature. Following Verbeek, the ambition of technological mediation approach is to stimulate people to take responsibility for their actions, practices and engagement with technologies -'to take responsibility for our technologically mediated existence ' (2011, 158) . One of the ways of doing so is to inform the public -the designers, (non-)users, government authorities -of the technologically mediated nature of our existence by mapping and studying the manifold mediating effects of technologies.
The ambition of the mediation approach is to provide people with the knowledge of the technologically mediated character of our lives. This is the first instance where we believe it demonstrates its normative nature. By presupposing that people need to be provided with such knowledge, the mediation approach implies that an ethics of technology should be grounded in the acknowledgement of our technologically mediated existence. According to Verbeek, '[i] nstead of focusing on whether certain technologies are morally acceptable or not, an ethics of the good life asks itself what a good way of living with such technology could be ' (2011, 157) . Since our life is increasingly entangled with technologies, it is impossible to live well without acknowledging, studying and acting on particular technological mediations. It is this knowledge that the technological mediation approach deems important to communicate. This knowledge enables people to make informed decisions about how to incorporate technologies in their lives. While this is not a sufficient basis for ethical evaluation -because it does not provide a normative standard against which to compare particular mediations -this is, in fact, a normative stance.
Another instance when mediation approach manifests its normative stance is by suggesting that the qualitative nature of mediations is as important to TA as its classical focus on harm avoidance and risk assessment. Following the technological mediation approach, the goal of TA is not complete without addressing the mediating effects of technologies on people and their relations to the world.
As mentioned earlier, from the perspective of technological mediation, values are shaped in interaction with technologies. But when we say that the mediated values are applied to 'assess' the same technologies that helped to shape them, the externalist position of 'assessment' is no longer appropriate because assessment presupposes an outside, uninfluenced position. In view of this, Verbeek (2011) suggested the term 'accompaniment' as a more fitting one than 'assessment.' Ethical constructive technology accompaniment (Verbeek 2011) would then follow technologies 'from within', from development stage to societal embedding. This addresses '"how" a technology could get a desirable role in society' (Kiran, Oudshoorn, and Verbeek 2015, 6 ) and accounts for the qualitative ethical impact it has both on society and evaluative frameworks. The focus on qualitative concerns emerging from 'within' human-technology relations as opposed to external assessment procedures is, as we will show later ( §4), what sets the technological mediation approach apart from existing TA practices.
By exploring the critique of the technological mediation approach on existing TA practices, we have revealed its normative ambitions. Firstly, by aligning itself with the explicitly normative practice of TA, the technological mediation approach becomes associated with the ambition to provide a desirable way for a particular technology to enter society. Secondly, the technological mediation approach argues that living a good life implies to acknowledge and to take responsibility for the technologically mediated nature of our existence. To do so, knowledge about technological mediations and their social impacts needs to be communicated to people. Therefore, lastly, revealing technological mediations from within human-technology relations should provide TA with the ethical qualitative component that remains a blind-spot to externalist assessment procedures.
This preliminary analysis of the normative ambitions of the technological mediation approach still does not answer the question whether the revealing of technological mediations can be fruitfully employed in terms of normative evaluation, and thus enhance TA practice. The technological mediation approach is critical of ethical evaluations that rely on external criteria. Consequently, it has to appeal to a normativity from 'within' human-technology relations, enabling it to accompany technological development. What could this normativity from 'within' be? This is the question we will explore in the following section.
Normativity from 'within'
In contrast to the mentioned TA approaches, the technological mediation approach strives to assess values constituted within human-technology relations. What kind of normativity do these relational values entail, and in what way can the mediation approach critically assess them from 'inside'? In the following, it will be argued that the normativity 'from within,' articulated in the work of Peter-Paul Verbeek, has both (1) an outspoken phenomenological-and (2) an existentialist footing. The first will be explored by calling attention to non-human intentionalities that potentially reside in technologies ( §3.1). The second derives from Verbeek's non-modernist concept of freedom ( §3.2). That these two sources of normativity are closely interlinked will be argued consequently ( §3.3).
Phenomenological normativity
Technologies mediate our moral involvement with the world: they shape the scope of our interests, appeal to our moral sensitivity and invite us to undertake or refrain from certain actions. In order to discern these technologically mediated normativities 'from within', we can explicate how artifacts guide human intentions. Such explorations we will here call a description of phenomenological normativities: the first kind of normativity that the mediation approach appeals to.
When looking through a pair of binoculars, our attention is directed into the distant and isolated from its immediate context (cf. Ihde 1990 Ihde , 2009 ). Also our moral inclinations can be guided by technologies. For instance, the telescope on a sniper rifle not only carries our view into the distant, but also targets a person appearing in its scope as a potential victim of assault.
2 When technologies guide the things humans might do and perceive, we speak of 'technological intentionality', referring to the Latin root intendere, meaning 'giving direction' (Verbeek 2011, 57) .
Verbeek explores the moral intricacies of technological intentionalities with the example of obstetric ultrasound used in prenatal care. Through the ultrasounds technology, we engage with a presentation of the unborn on a screen, which has a specific size that does not coincide with the actual size of the unborn. A (semi-)realistic image of the unborn thereby appears as semi-independent from the body of its mother, almost as an individual person, easily gendered and present as a patient since understood in terms of medical variables (Verbeek 2008, 24-25) . The ultrasound technology thus not only guides our view into places it had no epistemological access to before, but also establishes very distinct areas of moral interest and care. Different mediums-be those technological or not-carry a different spectrum of phenomenological normativity. For example, bodily experience and physical touch differ profoundly from genetic diagnostics or ultrasound.
Technologies thus articulate value-relations in various ways, thereby bringing up issues that could spur further ethical reflection. In contrast with existing TA approaches, however, the technological mediation approach does not question the desirability of a particular technology as such. In order to do this, an external standard of assessment (e.g. amount of choice-options available for the parents, decrease of health risks, cost-benefit stats etc.) should be invoked. Instead, the mediation approach merely reveals how moral concerns might appear within a situation as somehow relevant for us. For this reason, the normativity of the technological mediation approach does not claim superiority over and against a virtue-, deontological-or utilitarian ethics (Verbeek 2011, 61) . Rather, phenomenology builds a preliminary orientation from which different value deliberations might proceed. Identifying the phenomenological normativities as mediated by technologies is thus a kind of proto-ethics: a phrase John D. Caputo used to describe a Heideggerian inspired concept of moral affectivity (Caputo 1992) . Postphenomenologically speaking, we might say that technologies co-shape these moods (Stimmungen), not only attuning our moral sensibility in the world, but also expanding those, and modifying them. A gun inspires fear, gusto, and respect -depending on the situation and the persons involved. Binoculars engender curiosity, but also distrust, or even shame-depending on whether one observes, or is observed. And the prenatal use of ultrasound technology brings a whole new and intimate array of expectancy, care, and concern into being. It is the task of a postphenomenological ethics to make explicit these pre-reflective constituents of our moral landscape.
Existential normativity
Technologies have intentionalities, but they do not have a mind, a strong sense of agency or the ability to choose as humans do (Verbeek 2011, 59 ). 3 The latter are typical features of our human freedom, a concept Verbeek explores with reference to Isaiah Berlin and Michel Foucault. In human freedom resides the second normative idea that the technological mediation approach propounds. We identify this as existential normativity.
Verbeek criticizes the idea of a de-contextualized, pure autonomous subject as a modern humanistic fiction. Only the 'materially situated character of human existence creates forms of freedom' (Verbeek 2011, 60) . This inspires Verbeek's reading of Isaiah Berlin who discerns 'negative' and 'positive' freedom, the former being the absence of interference by others, the latter the amount of (self-)governance exercised in virtue of a goal (Berlin 1969 , Verbeek 2011 ). Verbeek takes the idea of negative liberty to be a relic of the modern mindset aspiring autonomy and detachment from external influences (Verbeek 2014, 84) . Positive freedom, however, he reads as a freedom-for, a freedom-putto-use within a certain context. This positive freedom then appears from 'within', in our relating through technologies, constituting the 'presence of the capability to act' of which 'technologies are its basis' (Ibid. 84).
To give an everyday example: when riding a bicycle, you can travel relatively fast, though not as fast as by car. But on the highroad, driving at 120 km an hour, it is hard to make a sudden stop and greet a friend: the bicycle gives you more possibilities in this respect. By foot, the distances you travel become subjectively (but not objectively) 'longer'. But walking, you can at any given moment pause and pick a bouquet of flowers. Your shoes, your bike and the car are all technological mediums by which you realize freedom in the world. Such technologies can be taken up and used in countless ways. But even though, for instance, a bike does not tell me where to go, it does tell me how I will be going in case I use it.
To give an example in the moral sphere: consider you want to give someone a welldeserved scolding. In case you make a phone-call, you demand the responder's attention immediately, but this person might well hang up in the middle of your rant. Texting is less intrusive, but the message loses gravity when appearing on a small display with emoticons. A hand-written letter takes more time to compose and deliver, though comes across more severe and is rarely casted aside unread. The medium of communication does not tell you what to say, but it will determine how you say it, how this is perceived, and through this, part of the 'scolding character' of the message is constituted.
Therefore, when using a particular technology, one cannot but subscribe to the material and immaterial rules of engagement that the mediator brings along. Concomitant to the many possible uses of a technology, therefore, Verbeek recognizes with Foucault that technologies also present already-established structures in which our moral conduct takes place (Foucault 1997; Verbeek 2011, 72) . These technological predispositions cannot be resisted negatively but must be interpreted, cultivated, particularized and used as ways to shape and realize our moral engagement with the world:
We can get actively involved in how these technologies have an impact on us. By critically examining how technologies help to shape situations of choice and frameworks of interpretation, it becomes possible to take responsibility for one's technologically mediated agency. (Verbeek 2014, 84) This we identify as the second source of normativity that Verbeek's mediation approach propounds: since our agency is always mediated, we ought to get involved responsibly with the technologies that surround us. By actively 'shap[ing] situations of choice and frameworks of interpretation' (Verbeek 2014, 84) , we realize ourselves as the technologically mediated beings that we are. To relate to technologies consciously is thus a fulfillment of our own existence, and the moral appeal that we must do so responsibly is therefore an existential one.
Phenomenological and existential normativity relating in the self
Martin Peterson, a critic of Verbeek, calls attention to the fact that -even though humans and technologies connect, only human beings bare (legal) responsibility for actions. For instance, in a shooting, we hold the shooter responsible, not the gun. For this reason, Peterson believes that Verbeek cannot get rid of the 'ordinary human being', the autonomous subject as the explanatory element of the action. To Peterson, the mediated compound of the-human-and-gun is therefore a superfluous (and possibly contradictory) element of explanation (M. Peterson in Selinger et al. 2012, 623) .
We believe that Peterson's criticism misses target, but raises an important question. Sticking to the example, Peterson misses target since, from a mediated perspective, the intention of the shooter and the act of violence cannot be conceived in detachment from the gun: both the intention and the positive freedom exercised depend on the technological medium. Only when appearing in a relation, the gun becomes a murder weapon and the human being a killer (cf. Latour 1994, 31) . Precisely for this reason, human and gun are physically separated in the legal ascription of guilt and execution of punishment: it would be downright dangerous to send the compound to prison. Peterson still raises an important question by noting that our ordinary sense of justice only holds the human responsible. The human-technology relation, in other words, is asymmetrical. The issue at stake, therefore, is this: how does human freedom take precedence over the technological medium of its expression? Can we conceive of this responsibility in non-modern terms, i.e. without taking recourse to a concept of autonomy or the 'ordinary human subject'?
We believe this question can be answered along the following lines. Even when abstracting human beings from their material situatedness, we do not end up with human freedom in autonomous isolation. Instead of detachment, an abstract conception of human freedom should reveal the primacy of human engagement with the world. The responsible human self is always relating to its technological relatedness, i.e. it takes heed of its being in the world through technologies. 4 This relatedness is reflexive, i.e. it is relatedness to the second degree. 5 Technologies have no such 'self', as relating to their relatedness is something technologies (generally) cannot do. For this reason, we hold the person responsible -and not the gun -when a shooting occurs.
To recapitulate: the two identified sources of normativity mutually imply one another, but are not identical. They are in fact two aspects of the same asymmetrical relation, stating existentially that we should engage whilst revealing phenomenologically what it is we are -or might be -and thereby will be concerned with. The aspects of that relation meet up in the reflexive human self, though not as an autonomous, but as a reflexive agency relating to its own relatedness. For this reason, the engagement that the existential normativity calls for issues a phenomenological stance. Vice versa, only by uncovering phenomenological normativities, it becomes apparent which responsibilities we face existentially.
The technological mediation approach as technology assessment?
In the previous sections, we showed that the technological mediation approach has the ambition to function as a possible addition to -or alternative for -existing TA approaches. It wishes to do so by revealing phenomenological and existential normativities grounded within human-technology relations. Accordingly, the technological mediation approach encourages human beings to take responsibility through continuous reflection, but does not offer an explicit ethical theory about how to legitimize future technologies. In this final section, we will discern whether this normative stance of the technological mediation approach can be integrated in existing TA approaches, or whether it instead breaks the mold of TA.
We will distinguish between a weak and a strong reading of the technological mediation approach and discuss to what extent the normativity implied in each of these readings is compatible with the aims of TA. In the weak reading, phenomenological normativity constitutes the core, while the strong reading holds that phenomenological and existential normativity imply one another. Only the weak reading, so we argue, is an augmentation of current (C)TA. Embracing the strong reading is inconsistent with the normative aims of TA. The purpose of this distinction is not to classify postphenomenologists and technological mediation theorists as either buying into a strong or a weak reading of technological mediation. Rather, we hope to offer a framework that allows for reflection on the potential implications of integrating the technological mediation approach into TA.
A weak reading: the technological mediation approach as addition
As explicated in §2.1, the importance of integrating qualitative ethical concerns in existing TA practices is central to both ethical TA (eTA) and eCTA (Kiran, Oudshoorn, and Verbeek 2015, 11; Palm and Hansson 2006, 550) . Both eTA and eCTA present themselves as methodological additions to existing TA approaches. Kiran, Oudshoorn and Verbeek suggest that although the eCTA approach is primarily an attempt at discerning moral issues that can be put to use in CTA, it can also prove its value as a framework for other, non-participatory methodologies that aim to come to grips with ethical issues in innovation. (2015, 16) Similarly, Hansson and Palm argue that eTA is a necessary addition to the already developed frameworks within TA, suggesting CTA as a promising framework (2006, 550) .
The crucial difference between eTA and eCTA lies in why they are interested in revealing qualitative ethical concerns. While eTA is interested in revealing ethical concerns to prevent negative future ethical consequences (negative ethical externalities) by relying on pre-defined and external ethical standards, eCTA considers revealing qualitative ethical concerns as a means to reflect on how we live in the world. In line with the aims of traditional TA, eTA focuses on the negative external effects of technologies, presupposing that current moral standards remain in place when new technologies are introduced. eCTA, on the contrary, is not primarily concerned with identifying -and possibly preventing -such negative ethical externalities, but rather with revealing the new potentialities for understanding and acting that accompany the introduction of new technologies. Doing so, eCTA allows to ask the question of how to live a good life in the context of ever-changing moral frameworks.
In the previous section, we showed that the technological mediation approach operates by revealing phenomenological and existential normativities that arise within our relation with technologies. Only by engaging in a relation with technologies we learn which moral issues will be at stake. Our moral frameworks develop in relation with technologies, and we can no longer take up the position of an external ethical subject judging whether or not technologies should be integrated in society. Hence, acknowledging the co-shaping of values by technologies is a necessary methodological addition to the existing practice of CTA. Only by adopting a position 'from within', researchers will be able to map the diverse phenomenological normativities that may foster ethical debate.
The aim of adding the technological mediation approach to CTA is to make designers and potential users aware of the possible mediations of values that accompany the introduction of new technologies. As we have argued in §3.1, these values become tangible by identifying the phenomenological normativities within human-technology relations. The addition that eCTA offers to existing TA practices can be formalized as (C)TA + Phenomenological Normativity = e(C)TA. This we call the 'weak' reading of the technological mediation approach because it aims to detach phenomenological normativities from existential normativities, and can be considered a methodological augmentation of existing TA practices. In this way, the technological mediation approach offers a possibility of doing proto-ethics by revealing technologically instantiated fore-structures of understanding the world.
The practical consequence of accepting the weak reading of the technological mediation approach is that assessment requires mapping out the phenomenological normativities arising within human-technology relations. Contrary to other approaches, such as eTA, these normativities from within do not offer guidelines about the things that should be taken into account in TA. In the weak reading, the technological mediation approach provides a rich landscape of possible normative concerns that can stimulate our ethical reflection.
A strong reading: the technological mediation approach and existential directedness
In the strong reading of the technological mediation approach, it is not possible to isolate phenomenological normativities from existential normativities. When mapping phenomenological normativities, the technological mediation approach presents the possible moral dilemmas that will arise and should be taken up. Embracing the existential implications of the technological mediation approach implies that a better understanding of the technologically mediated nature of our lives is a necessary condition for ethical reflection. An ethics of technology should recognize and act upon the inherent normativities arising in our relation with technologies. Normativity here should be understood in terms of the possible existential concerns that need to be dealt with. Crucially, the specific structure of these existential concerns cannot be identified beforehand, because they are co-shaped in the relation between ourselves and the technologies we deal with. In order to illustrate the significance of this shift, we now provide an alternative description of the ultrasound example, discussed in §3.1, highlighting how technologies reconfigure our relation with the world.
When mapping the phenomenological normativities of the ultrasound, we see that it places the fetus outside of the mother's womb, and creates a semi-realistic image of it in which the fetus has a specific size that does not coincide with its actual size. Consequently, the ultrasound actively helps in constructing an understanding of the fetus as a gendered individual that appears as a patient, easily conceptualized in terms of medical variables. However, besides offering a specific image of the fetus, the ultrasound also presents a specific image of our future self as father-to-be or mother-to-be that needs to take care of a child-to-be. It thereby co-shapes the temporality of our human existence. The ultrasound not only directs us to specific features of the fetus highlighted by the way it is presented but also directs us to a specific future self that must relate to this specific presentation.
Technologies therefore make us question who we want to be in the future, which future decisions need to be made and which actions one should undertake when constructing our future self. This is why we argue that in the strong reading of the technological mediation approach, phenomenological normativity is always intertwined with existential normativity. The ultrasound actively invites to ask ourselves what it means to be a responsible parent, and to ask what the limits of our parental capabilities can be. The latter becomes especially apparent when considering that ultrasound technologies can be used to predict whether a future child will have Down syndrome. While this has been analyzed from the perspective of technological mediation in terms of the desirability of future individuals with potential mental disability (Verbeek 2008) , we aim to highlight that the ultrasound primarily directs the parents-to-be towards the existential concern whether they want to take care of a child with a potential mental disability. From within this relation, the subject faces itself, making the future suddenly appearing as a necessary concern.
The detection of phenomenological normativities is entangled with the process of establishing this existential self-awareness. Rather than anticipating the future workings of technologies, the strong view suggests that through making potential mediations explicit, we face our own possible future. In this sense, the normativity of the technological mediation approach does not ask whether technologies will play a desirable role in society, but makes us inquire how to know and realize our selves through technological means. The strong reading of the technological mediation approach thus introduces a new kind of normativity that rules out the possibility of adopting an external position from which technologies can be assessed. As we will argue below, this is at odds with the goals of TA.
The strong reading of the technological mediation approach reveals the connection between technologies and existential concerns. Dealing with these concerns is not equivalent with asking whether or not our future becomes present in terms of 'good' or 'bad'. Rather, it allows individuals to ask what the relation between themselves and their future is. For example, the ultrasound constitutes a mother-to-be or father-to-be, but does not specify what kind of father or mother one will actually become. In other words, technologies help in shaping an existential context but do not determine its content. Specific technologies will continuously instantiate specific existential concerns, which continuously force us to ask how to shape our future.
The technological mediation approach as ethics of accompaniment
Kiran, Oudshoorn and Verbeek remark that 'the ethics of technology should focus on technology accompaniment rather than TA ' (2015, 14) . But what does this idea of accompaniment, taken in the sense of the strong reading, imply for the ambition of technological mediation approach to augment existing TA practices, such as CTA? Can the technological mediation approach still be meaningfully transformed into an eCTA if it excludes the possibility of an externalist position?
The weak reading of the technological mediation approach acknowledges the existence of phenomenological normativity, and considers it an important addition to existing TA approaches. In this case, the technological mediation approach should map potential mediations that can become subject of further ethical evaluation. The mapping of phenomenological normativities is primarily a methodological addition, and can be used to articulate potential qualitative ethical concerns that would remain invisible otherwise.
In the strong reading, phenomenological and existential normativity cannot be separated: mapping possible mediations necessarily entails existentially engaging with and taking responsibility for them. Through this existential engagement, an understanding of oneself as a relational being is explicitly established. This understanding precisely consists in explicating our inevitable relation with technologies. In this strong reading, an ethics of accompaniment is not the accompaniment of a technology that is external to the self, but a constant accompaniment of the own self in relation to its undetermined future.
In the technological mediation approach, people understand themselves insofar as they interact with and ascribe meaning to the technologies they relate with. In the strong reading, any anticipation of future ethical consequences must be considered an explication of what we expect from our present relation with technologies. Any ethical reflection on the future is therefore an articulation of our present concerns. The technological mediation approach invites people to embrace this inevitability and to take responsibility for the development of their future selves and the concerns they will engage in. In this way, it is underlined that human beings need to actively shape themselves, and that this process of self-shaping always occurs in relation with specific technologies. Only by actively relating to this relation and the phenomenological normativities that arise in it can existential normativities be meaningfully identified.
This is also why we should contrast the notion of 'accompaniment' with the notion of 'assessment'. Consulting the etymological roots of the concepts already reveals the difference between them. Accompaniment is a transformation of the old French word accompaignier, 'to take as a companion'. Assessment goes back to the Medieval Latin assessare, a verb associated with the fixing of the amount of taxes and fines. Accordingly, it is no longer our job to take care ahead of time by fixing the future of technologies. Rather, the technological mediation approach pleads to acknowledge that technologies are already our companion, of which we should continuously take care. In taking care of this companion, we take care of our own future.
Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to explore whether the technological mediation approach can provide TA with a normative basis through which our relation with (emerging) technologies can be evaluated. We have done so by exploring the normative aspirations and footings of the technological mediation approach.
Firstly, we have situated the technological mediation approach within the history of TA. This revealed that the technological mediation approach aims to fill the normative deficit in TA by focusing on qualitative ethical concerns. Moreover, because ethical frameworks change in interaction with the technologies they are meant to assess externally, the technological mediation approach argues that ethical concerns should be addressed from 'within'. Secondly, we have explicated the normative basis that the technological mediation approach offers to address ethical concerns from 'within'. We have discerned a phenomenological and an existential normativity. The mapping of phenomenological normativities is characterized as a proto-ethics: it spells out possible mediations that appeal to our moral sensitivity that can incite further moral reflection. Simultaneously, however, these phenomenological normativities present possible vehicles to realize our freedom. Thereby an appeal to our existential normativity is revealed.
Thirdly, we have considered how these types of normativity relate to the aim of TA in order to answer our main question whether the technological mediation approach should be considered complementary to TA, or whether it calls for a replacement of existing ethical TA practices. We have identified a strong and a weak reading of the technological mediation approach. In the weak reading, phenomenological normativity is methodically isolated from existential normativity. This reading can be summarized as (c)TA + Phenomenological Normativity = e(C)TA. The mapping of phenomenological normativities is, in the weak reading, an augmentation of existing TA approaches because it provides a more effective way to reveal moral concerns. In the strong reading, phenomenological and existential normativities go hand in hand. This implies that the mapping of phenomenological normativities must be seen as a self-accompaniment where a person continuously discovers her/his own needs and expectations, and is not assessing something external.
We believe that this strong reading challenges the ambition of the technological mediation approach to enter the field of TA. In this strong view, doing ethics of technology becomes doing ethics from technologies, because the internal normativity of the technological mediation approach only arises within relations between humans and technologies. In this reading, it is emphasized how existential concerns arise within human-technology relations, and how these concerns constitute a relation between people and their future. Explicating the presence of these relations creates an openness that allows people to actively shape this future through their relation with technologies. Read in this strong way, the protoethics of mapping phenomenological normativities is already an explication of a specific relation with the future within which potential actions are already assumed.
In eCTA, a proto-ethics is derived from the phenomenological normativities present in concrete technologies. Also other approaches within the fields of TA intend to reveal normativities arising with the introduction of new technologies. For example, Grunwald's hermeneutical TA can be understood as a form of proto-ethics, yet is explicitly presented as an augmentation of current TA practices (e.g. Grunwald 2016, 61) . Making the interests underlying the design of techno-visions explicit creates better prepared -i.e. more rational -citizens for discussing new technologies in the democratic arena. For Grunwald, making these assumptions explicit is only preparatory work before ethical analysis (Ibid. 63), strikingly similar to how in the weak reading of technological mediation the mapping of phenomenological normativities is a preparation for technology assessment. Whether or not a 'strong reading' of Grunwald's program similarly calls for a transformation of TA, instead of an augmentation to it, is a question for future research. However, we suggest that when developing a proto-ethics, be it with regard to concrete technologies, the visions accompanying emerging technologies, or other concerns in TA, one must ask to what extent a proto-ethical analysis is itself not already normatively determining the topics and concerns that should be discussed and taken care of.
